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Financing Wyoming's Public Schools: The
Wyoming Legislature Gets to Try Again
William E. Sparkman,*John Dayton,** and Fred HartmeisterINTRODUCTION

[T]he legislature must first design the best educational system by
identifying the "proper" educational package each Wyoming
student is entitled to have whether she lives in Laramie or in
Sundance. The cost of that educational package must then be
determined and the legislature must then take the necessary action
to fund that package. Because education is one of the state's most
important functions, lack of financial resources will not be an
acceptable reason for failure to provide the best educational system. All other financial considerations must yield until education
is funded.
The state financed basket of quality educational goods and
services available to all school-age youth must be nearly identical
from district to district. If a local district then wants to enhance
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the content of that basket, the legislature can provide a mechanism by which it can be done. But first, before all else, the constitutional basket must be filled.'
In the concluding remarks to its unanimous November, 1995 decision in Campbell County School District v. State, the Wyoming Supreme
Court left no doubt as to the precise contours of the state's responsibility
for providing and adequately financing public education in the state. In
doing so, the court clearly and unequivocally concluded that the state's
present system of financing its public schools is unconstitutional. The
court gave the Wyoming legislature until July 1, 1997, to comply with its
judgment by adopting reform legislation and implementing a new school
finance system. 2
Campbell illustrates the power of the language embedded in the state
constitution's education article and the determination of the supreme court
that the legislature must act affirmatively to comply with its constitutional
duty. From a national perspective, the result adds to the growing number
of school finance cases in which the decision goes beyond fiscal equity
and challenges the state to provide a constitutionally adequate educational
program that is equitably financed.' What began as a challenge to certain
components of the state school finance system has essentially ended with a
command to the legislature to reform the state's public school system by
defining the best educational system for each student, to determine the
cost of that educational package, and then to provide the necessary funds
to support that system of public education as its paramount constitutional
duty." Moreover, the quality educational programs available to students
must be nearly identical from school district to school district. Lack of
available financial resources will not be an excuse, and public education
will have first claim to available resources before other considerations.
This article begins with a breakdown of the Campbell decision and
includes a summary of prior Wyoming school finance legislation and litigation. This section is followed by a brief overview of public school finance as
it presently exists in the fifty states. The Campbell decision is then analyzed
for its consistencies and inconsistencies as viewed within the context of the
contemporary majority rule in school finance litigation.
1. Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995) (Campbell).
2. Id. at 1280.
3. See infra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
4. In a subsequent order denying rehearing and responding to requests for clarification, the
court stated that its ruling in Campbell "was prospective in operation and not intended to disturb present statutory provisions for financing of school operations, including bonded indebtedness." Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1281.
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I.

CAMPBELL-AN OVERVIEW

A. Background
In January, 1992, four Wyoming school districts brought suit against
the State of Wyoming and various elected state officials asserting that5
certain elements of the state school finance system were unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs based their claims on the Wyoming Constitution's equal
protection clause6 and the education article.' A coalition of twenty-three
of the smaller school districts in the state intervened as defendants with
the state.' Laramie County School District No. One and the Wyoming
Education Association then intervened as plaintiffs aligned with the
original four plaintiff school districts and claimed that certain additional
elements of the school finance system also were unconstitutional .' For the
most part, the school district litigants separated themselves according to
student population. The larger or more heavily student populated districts
were positioned as plaintiffs, whereas the smaller or less populated districts were aligned with the state. Essentially, the large district plaintiffs
contended that the school finance system failed to fund their actual operating costs of the basic education program - thus denying their students an
equal opportunity to a quality education. The small districts, on the other
hand, intervened with the state in an attempt to maintain the status quo,
thus attempting to protect themselves from a possible redistribution of
existing funds if the plaintiffs prevailed. From the perspective of the small
districts, the funding formula was weighted appropriately in their favor
since it recognized that it arguably costs more to educate each student in a
less populated school district. The small districts felt that the present
system provided sufficient revenue for a minimal educational program for
all school districts in the state.' 0 Ultimately, at issue were five primary
components of Wyoming's public school finance system: the divisor feature, the municipal divisor feature, the recapture provision, the optional
local mill levy, and the capital construction feature. 1I

5. The original plaintiffs included Campbell County School District No. One, Uinta County
School District No. One, and Sweetwater County School Districts Nos. One and Two. The state
officials included the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Governor, the State Treasurer,
and members of the State Board of Education. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1243-44. The Governor and
State Treasurer were later dismissed from the case. Id. at 1244 n. 1.
6. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 34 states that "All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
application."
7. WYO. CONST. art. Vi, §§ 1-14.
8. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1244.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1251.
11. Id. at 1244.
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Following an October, 1993 trial, the state district court for the First
Judicial District, Laramie County, ruled that the municipal divisor feature, the recapture provision, and the optional local mill levy were unconstitutional. The district court also concluded that both the divisor and the
capital construction components were constitutional. 2 The plaintiffs appealed that portion of the trial court's decision dealing with the divisor
and capital construction components; conversely, the state-aligned defendants appealed the ruling as to the municipal divisor, recapture, and
optional local mill levies. 3 In Campbell, the Wyoming Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision that the municipal divisor, recapture,
and optional mill levy were unconstitutional. However, the supreme court
reversed the lower court's decision with respect to the constitutionality of
the divisor and capital construction features. 14 In effect, the court concluded that the entire foundation program for funding public education in
Wyoming was unconstitutional.
The supreme court identified three foundational questions which served
to summarize the multitude of disparate issues presented for its consideration:
1. Whether the court's exercise of its judicial power to declare
school finance system statutes unconstitutional violates the doctrine of separation of powers?
2. Whether the court must apply a rational basis or strict scrutiny
standard of review to determine the constitutionality of the
school finance system statutes?
3. Whether the challenged components of the school finance system
are constitutional under the appropriate standard of review."'
The court's resolution of these issues was influenced by several
important factors including its 1980 decision in Washakie County
School District No. One v. Herschler;'6 the ostensible reform measures
enacted by the state legislature following the Washakie decision; the
operation of the challenged school finance system; the procedural
background of Campbell; the rationale supporting the district court's
decision; and, perhaps most importantly, the language of the state
constitution's education article and how the existing educational system
was operating under those constitutional provisions."

12.

Id.

13. Id.
14.

Id.

15. Id.
16. 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.). cert. denied, 449 U. S. 824 (1980).

17. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1245-46.
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B. The Washakie Decision
School finance litigation seems to unfold as a continuing saga as legislatures respond to judicial mandates by "reforming" successfully challenged
finance systems with the attendant political compromises-only to face additional legal challenges later as the hope of reform vanishes in the reality of
policies that failed to go far enough to rectify the alleged disparities.' 8 Public
school finance in Wyoming has been no exception as the state's supreme
court declared in 1980 that the system violated the state's equal protection
clause in Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler.9 Although
Washaie was decided on the basis of the state's equal protection clause,"
several important finance issues arose from the 1980 case that guided the
supreme court 15 years later in Campbell. First, the Washakie court reaffirmed an earlier position that, "as nearly as practicable, funds derived from
ad valorem tax levies must be equally divided amongst the school districts of
the entire state. " 2 Second, the court ruled that the education provisions of the

18. See generally, Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School FinanceLitigation:A
New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y at 517 n.8 (1991) (where various factors are discussed in fiscal equity law suits that give rise to continued litigation over time).
19. 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). On June 20, 1978, three school districts and their school
board members filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to have the Wyoming school finance
system declared unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the state constitution. The
plaintiffs claimed that they had a right to a school finance system under the state constintion
that provided a relatively uniform amount of money per pupil to each of the state's school districts, a claim grounded in the notion of equal educational opportunity. Moreover, they claimed
that under the extant school finance system, which had been created by the legislature, they
were denied equal educational opportunity because of the fiscal disparities resulting from the
state system. A district court dismissed the complaint on procedural grounds after some intermediate proceedings. On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had standing
to sue, and that the claim stated a justiciable cause of action. Consequently, the court ruled on
the merits of the case. After reviewing the evidence of substantial disparities in assessed valuation per pupil and total revenue per pupil generated under the school finance system, the court
concluded that the quality of a child's education depended upon local property wealth. The
court held the right to an education cannot be conditioned on local wealth in that such a system
does not afford equal protection. In making its determination that the school finance system was
constitutionally flawed, the court had to determine the appropriate standard of review for an
equal protection challenge based on adequate and independent state grounds arising under the
state constitution. The court determined that education was a fundamental interest under the
Wyoming Constitution, and that property wealth was a suspect classification; thus requiring that
the statutory finance scheme be subjected to strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, the state has
the burden of demonstrating a compelling state interest which is served by that challenged law
and which cannot be attained by less onerous alternatives. The court concluded that the state
failed to show that other methods of achieving equality in financing were not possible. Id.
20. Id. at 340.
21. Id. at 319. This determination was grounded in the court's 1972 decision in Sweetwater
County Planning Comm. for Org. of Sch. Dist. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), where the
court relinquished jurisdiction over a school district reorganization plan until the legislature convened
to deal with the issue of the equalization of ad valorem taxes for school purposes on a statewide basis.
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state constitution "leave no doubt that the legislature has complete control of
the state's school system in every respect, including division of the state into
school districts and providing for their financing."' Third, education in
Wyoming is a fundamental interest under the state constitution. ' Fourth, with
respect to the unequal distribution of school revenues, the court made several
critical observations: most school funds were not distributed according to the
need for quality education,I equality of dollar input is a manageable criterion,' disparity in financial resources relates directly to the quality of education,26 and there is no practical way to achieve equality of quality education
until equality of educational financing is achieved.27 Fifth, exact or absolute
equality in per pupil funding is not required given the need to compensate for
special needs of individual students, groups, and local conditions.' Sixth, any
funding system devised "must not create a level of spending which is a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole."2 9 Seventh, the
financing of capital outlay for school facilities is part of the total educational
package and must be equalized by the state.3" In declaring the extant school
finance system under consideration in Washakie as violative of the state's
equal protection clause, the court ordered that the legislature devise a constitutional plan that would be implemented by July 1, 1982. According to the
court, the goal of any such plan was financial parity among the state's school
districts. 3

However, the court acknowledged that it could no longer ignore inequalities in school taxes throughout the state. Id.
Just a year later and in yet another school district reorganization case, the court revisited the
issue and reiterated the serious nature of the fiscal disparities caused by differences in the assessed
valuation of local real property. Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1973). The court warned
that such fiscal disparities could be construed to be a denial of equal protection. Id. at 816.
22. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 320.
23. Id. at 333.
24. Id. at 334.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336. See generally KERN ALEXANDER & RICHARD G. SALMON,
PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 221 (1995) (where the authors discuss how states have attempted to provide
unequal treatment for unequals; i.e. vertical equity, by various adjustments to the school finance
formula designed to accommodate legitimate differences in educational needs of pupils as well as differences in the characteristics of schools and school districts that influence costs).
29. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336. See generally JOHN COONS Er AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION 2 (1970) (where the principle of fiscal neutrality (i.e., expenditures per pupil
should not be related to local school district property wealth) was introduced into the legal discourse
on school finance equity.
30. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 337.
31. Id.
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C. School Finance Reform in the Aftermath of Washakie
The school finance system that was declared unconstitutional in
Washakie was a foundation-type plan whereby the state shares in the cost
of a minimum education for every student by providing a subvention to
local school districts in an inverse relation to their local wealth.32 Following the court's decision, a select committee of the Wyoming legislature
addressed the issues raised in Washakie, and made certain recommendations to the legislature for changing the distribution formula. The legislature then enacted statutes to reform the school finance system, including a
mandatory local 25-mill levy, a state 12-mill levy and an optional county
six-mill levy.33 One of the select committee's recommendations was to
redistribute some local wealth to other districts as a way of making the
school finance system fiscally neutral.' A constitutional amendment was
approved by the voters authorizing the legislature to recapture from the
wealthy school districts revenues generated by the local 25-mill levy
which exceeded the foundation amount.35 However, local wealth remained
36
a factor in the finance plan because of the optional six-mill local levy.
When the new school finance system was implemented in 1983, the
legislature declared that it was only transitional and would later be succeeded by another system that would be designed to more accurately
reflect the costs of education. 37 However, as noted by the court in Campbell, the "legislature never studied, enacted, or implemented a new costbased system, and the 1983 interim system became permanent." 38

32. Algebraically, state aid per pupil (SAPP) for a foundation program is:
SAPP = FEPP - (RTR x PVPP),

where
FEPP= foundation expenditure per pupil,
RTR= local required tax rate, and
PVPP = local property value per pupil.
A district's total state aid (TSA) would be:
TSA = SAPP x Pupils,

where
SAPP = state aid per pupil, and
Pupils = number of students in the school district.*
*Teacher units could be substituted and used as the needs measure.
See also ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 174

(1992).
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1246-47.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. at 1246-47.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
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D. Operation of the Challenged School Finance System
In order to provide a context for a discussion of the five components
of the school finance system that were challenged in the Campbell district
court trial, the general framework of the Wyoming school finance plan is
presented. Like all state school finance plans with the exception of Hawaii,39 Wyoming relies upon a complex equalization formula designed to
provide some degree of fiscal equality among the state's 49 school districts. Equalization formulas are designed as a cost sharing arrangement
between the state and the local school districts whereby state aid goes to
the local school districts in an inverse relation to local wealth.'
Under the statutory formula implementing the State Foundation
Program, each school district computes the amount of funding to which it
is entitled. This amount is called the foundation guarantee, and amounted
to $92,331 per classroom unit in Wyoming in 1992."' The foundation
guarantee is determined by the number of classroom units (CRU) a district can claim based on the ratio of students to teachers in schools of
differing enrollments multiplied by the state guaranteed minimum guaranteed dollar value per classroom unit.42 A CRU is based upon a formula
which is predicated on an assumption of diseconomies of scale-that it
costs more per student to educate students in districts with fewer students
than it does to educate students in districts with more students. The CRU
is calculated by dividing a school's average daily membership (ADM) by
another number known as a divisor.43 A different divisor is used for
elementary, junior, and senior high schools." The statutory divisor schedule ranges from a divisor of 8 to 23.' The divisor increases as the size of
the student population in the school increases. The smallest schools in
terms of ADM are guaranteed one classroom unit. An interesting feature

39. John A. Thompson, Public School Finance and Governance Issues in Hawaii, in SCHOOL
FINANCE POLICY ISSUES IN THE STATES AND PROVINCES: ANNUAL

UPDATE 1995, 41 (Carla

Edlefson, ed. 1995). Hawaii is the only state in the union that has a single statewide school district
that is governed in part by an elected board of education, and partly by the legislature of the state. It
is also the only state in which none of the funding for education is raised through the use of a property tax. Id.
40.

See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,

UNDERSTANDING

STATE SCHOOL

FINANCE FORMULAS (1987).

41. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1249.
42. Id. at 1248-49.
43. Id. Average daily membership is a method used by school agencies to count and report
students. It is determined by the number of students enrolled in a school averaged over the counting
period, usually a period of one month, six weeks, or some other period of time. Id.
44. Id. at 1249.
45. Id. (citing BARRY W. NIMMO, THE WYOMING SCHOOL FOUNDATION PROGRAM-A BRIEF
LOOK AT OPERATIONS AND FUNDING 49 (1990-91), and quoting WYo. STAT. § 21-13-308(c) (1977)).
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of the classroom unit calculation is that all schools of a particular category located within the incorporated area of a city or town, must be
treated as one school. Therefore, the classroom units for districts with
several smaller schools located in one town are calculated using the larger
divisors which provide for proportionally fewer classroom units and fewer
dollars per pupil. The school district then computes the amount of funding
it will generate through local taxes, fines, and fees. When local revenues
are less than the foundation guarantee, that difference is paid to the school
district as a foundation entitlement. When local revenues exceed the
guarantee, then the school districts does not receive a state entitlement. In
some cases, excessive local revenues result in the school district's rebating a certain amount to the state. That rebate amount is known as foundation recapture and is returned to the state's foundation fund for eventual
redistribution to qualifying low property wealth school districts. In addition to a foundation guarantee based upon enrollment, past expenditures
for "add-ons " ' are also calculated to determine the total amount of the
foundation guarantee. For example, school districts are reimbursed for 75
percent of their transportation expenditures and 85 percent of their special
education expenditures.'
The court observed that the value of the classroom unit as well as
the schedule of divisors are determined by the legislature based upon
assumption and are not based on any cost study or analysis.' According to the court, the divisor is a critical element in determining the
number of classroom units for each school district and, consequently,
the amount of revenue a school district will receive.49 Another critical
element which can limit a school district's funds is the municipal divisor which treats all schools of a certain level as one local school when
such schools are all within an incorporated city or town or within five
miles of an incorporated city or town.' The formula permits recalculation for school districts which actually have higher student populations
than estimated. 5'
Local school districts may also generate funds through the optional
mill levy, which are outside of the Foundation Program and will not

46. Id. at 1248 n.7 ("add ons" include transportation operation and maintenance, transportation
capital outlay, tuition paid, costs of isolationlhomebound students, special education, one-teacher
schools, and vocational education).
47. Id. at 1248.
48. Id. at 1249.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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reduce a school district's state entitlement. 2 The amount of local funds
generated through the optional mill levy is completely dependent upon
assessed local property values. Thus, wealthy districts can raise more
money per mill than can poorer districts.53 There is, however, some state
power equalization to assist poorer districts.' Funding for capital construction is also distinct from the Foundation Program.5
E. Campbell's ProceduralHistory
In 1992, four of Wyoming's larger school districts initiated a
challenge of the school fiance system that had been put into place
following the Washakie decision. 56 The plaintiff districts presented
evidence that in the intervening years since Washakie the legislative
changes in the finance system had increased and exacerbated the fiscal
disparity among the state's school districts. The plaintiffs claimed that
the fiscal disparities were unjustifiable and constituted a denial of
equal educational opportunity. They sought a declaratory judgment that
the extant school finance system was unconstitutional under the
Washakie requirement of equality of financing in order to achieve
equality of quality education. 7
The plaintiff school districts argued that the finance system including
the methods for raising and allocating the revenues and funding capital
construction created fiscal disparities of two kinds. One type of disparity
was wealth driven, meaning that it was related to differences in local
school district wealth among the state's 49 school districts. Specifically,
the plaintiffs challenged the statutes authorizing the optional mill levy, the
109-percent recapture level, and the capital construction funding as creating wealth-driven disparities.5 8 The other type of alleged disparity related
to irrational and arbitrary spending. Here the plaintiffs argued that certain
features of the finance system perpetuated spending differences among the
school districts that were not justified on the basis of actual cost differences. The specific statutes attacked for causing irrational, arbitrary spending

52. Id.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1249-50. The term "power equalization" refers to the fact that the state provides
funds to those poorer districts where one voter-approved optional mill raises less than the state average assessed property value. Id.
55. Id. at 1249-50
56. Id. at 1243. The four original plaintiff school districts were Campbell County School
District No. One. Uinta County School District No. One, and Sweetwater County School Districts
Nos. One and Two. Id.
57. Campbell. 907 P.2d at 1250.

58. Id.
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differences included the divisor system, the municipal divisor, and recalculation. 9
In response, the state and its allies raised a variety of defenses.
Essentially, they maintained that the plaintiffs had the burden of proof in
establishing the veracity of their claims by showing clearly and exactly
beyond any reasonable doubt that funding disparities existed and that such
disparities were either wealth-driven or otherwise unjustified by cost
differentials. The defendants also countered with an affirmative defense
that any disparities necessary to achieve program equity between school
districts were not unconstitutional.'
During pre-trial activity, the district court ruled that fiscal disparities
resulting from the distribution formula (i.e., the divisor system, the municipal divisor, and recalculation), did not invoke strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis. With respect to these components of the finance
formula, the district court determined that the plaintiffs had the burden to
prove that the resulting disparities were justified on the basis of actual
costs. 6 To meet this burden of proof, the plaintiffs were required by the
court to prove the following elements:
1. A funding mechanism resulting in a disparity of funds per pupil,
not justified by cost differences;
2. That such unjustified disparity exists by virtue of an irrational
feature in the formula adopted by the legislature; and,
That such formula results in a persistent and intractable condition of disparity not justified by costs.62
Harm to educational opportunity would be presumed by the district
court if the plaintiffs could prove their claim that the fiscal disparities
were unjustified.63
3.

F. The District Court's Decision
Following a three-week trial, the district court ruled on each of
the challenged components of the state's school finance system and
came to several different conclusions under the equal protection claim.
The district court reconsidered its pre-trial determination as to what

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1251.
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level of judicial scrutiny would be applied to the various challenged
statutes. Specifically, the district court ruled that strict scrutiny would
be applied to the components of the finance system that were alleged
to cause wealth-driven disparities (i.e., the recapture provision, the
optional six-mill levy, and the capital construction feature).' The court
also ruled that a variation of the rational basis test in the nature of
equitable distribution and which invokes a heightened standard of
scrutiny would be applied to the distribution formula components (i.e.,

the divisor, the municipal divisor, and recalculation).'
Three issues involved the distribution formula components, with
most attention given to the divisors. The court applied the equitable distribution/rational basis test and held that the basic components of the distribution formula were constitutional.' This conclusion was reached despite
several facts that might otherwise have suggested a contrary decision.
First, the district court had accepted the plaintiffs' proof that funding
disparities existed as a result of the divisor system resulting in a real
funding disadvantage to the students in the larger districts.67 Second, the
court also had accepted that the divisor system itself was flawed in two
respects: first, the classroom unit value was arbitrarily based upon political decisions rather than actual cost determinations; and second, the resulting distribution caused funding disparities which were linked to potential differences in educational opportunity.' Moreover, the court expressed "serious doubts about the fairness of the funding formula. "69
Despite the findings of fact demonstrating funding differences resulting
from arbitrary measures, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs had not
provided necessary evidence to demonstrate the level and impact of the
funding differences. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to carry their burden of proof. It should be noted that the
district court had earlier held that the plaintiffs did not have to prove that
an unjustified disparity necessarily caused harm to educational opportunity.' The district court also held that the municipal divisor was not rationally justified by real cost differences and thus did not satisfy the equitable distribution test. 7' The district court did not make a ruling on the
related issue of recalculation.7
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1256.
67. Id.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1250-51.
71. Id. at 1256.
72. Id.
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The remaining three issues dealt with the wealth-based disparities
(i.e., recapture, optional local mill levy, and capital construction finance).
On these issues the district court invoked strict scrutiny, and found that
both the recapture and optional mill levy provisions created fiscal disparities unjustifiably conditioned upon local wealth.73 Both components were
declared unconstitutional. With respect to capital construction finance, the
court concluded that the evidence failed to establish proof of harm to a
constitutionally protected right and held it constitutional.74
G. Wyoming's Education Article and the Statutory Finance System
The most compelling factor that was crucial to the supreme court's
decision in Campbell was the nature of the legislature's constitutional duty
under the state's education article to provide for public education. The
education article is that collection of constitutional provisions which contain substantive statements about the state's role in public education. 75 It
was in this bright light that the court inspected the basic characteristics of
the state's educational finance system that had been created by statute
pursuant to the constitution.
At the onset, the supreme court noted that education is a fundamental
right under the provisions of the Declaration of Rights article of the constitution. 6 The court observed that once the state constitution embraced the fundamental importance of education, it then described in some detail the responsibilities and requirements of the education in a subsequent article.' For
the court, the fact that the right to a public education was delineated in the
Declaration of Rights article coupled with the expansive language of the
constitution's education article, evidenced that "the framers and ratifiers ensured, protected and defined a long cherished principle"-arguably strong
state control of public education.78
The court observed that its prior decision in Washakie "established
that the right to education correlated to a duty of the legislature, holding

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally, William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35
B.C. L. REV. 572 (1994) (discussing the historical development of state education clauses).
76. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1257. The constitution states:
The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practical recognition,
The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the
sciences and liberal arts.
WYO. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
77. Id. at 1257. The constitutional requirements for Wyoming's education system are addressed in WYO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1-14.
78. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1257.
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Art. 7, § 1 obligated the legislature to affirmatively act to establish and
support a comprehensive system of public education."'79 Moreover, the
court held that the education article further defined the nature of the
education system.'
Relying upon both historical interpretations as well as modem definitions, the court then set about construing the meaning of the education
articles. Given that the right to education was held to be fundamental, the
court averred that the constitutional provisions governing public education
must be broadly construed."' On the basis of its liberal construction of the
terms in the education articles,' the court concluded that the education
system contemplated by the state constitution was:
an organization forming a network for serving the common purpose of public schools which organization is marked by full detail
or complete in all respects and productive without waste and is
reasonably sufficient for the appropriate or suitable teaching/education/learning of the state's school age children.
Moreover, the court concluded that the intent of the education articles was to serve as a mandate to the state legislature:
to provide an education system of a character which provides
Wyoming students with a uniform opportunity to become
equipped for their future roles as citizens, participants in the
political system, and competitors both economically and intellectually.'

79. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1257 (citing Washakie, 606 P.2d at 320). The specific constitutional
language requiring the legislature to establish and support schools is as follows:
The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and
uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed
kind and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the public
good may require and the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may be
necessary.
Wyo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
80. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1257. The court quoted WYO. CONST. art VII, § 9 which states in part:
The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the
income arising from the general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state,
between the ages of six and twenty-one years ..
81. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1258.
82. Id. The court focused on the phrases "a complete and uniform system of public instruction" and "a thorough and efficient system of public schools adequate to the proper instruction of the
state's youth" in its analysis of critical concepts and terminology. Id.
83. Id. at 1258-59.
84. Id. at 1259.
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Noting that the constitution directs the creation of two systems to
deliver education (i.e., a complete and uniform system of public instruction, and a thorough and efficient system of public schools), the
court concluded that the purpose of the dual requirements is to provide
a "proper" education to all school children.' Therefore, according to
the court, the legislature must "define and specify what a 'proper'
education is for a Wyoming child" in order for it to discharge its constitutional duty.'
The court then turned its attention to the statutory regime provide
by legislation for public education in the state. It delineated the duties
of the state superintendent of schools,'2 the state board of education,"
local school boards 89 with respect to the quality of the elementary and
secondary education system, and noted that local school boards are
directed by the legislature to comply with the education program established for the entire state.' To further explicate the legislature's role
in public education, the court recognized that the legislature had mandated a specified curriculum requirement for the study of the state and
federal constitutions9 1 along with a penalty for noncompliance. 92
Despite the extensive statutory language implementing the provisions of the education articles, the court noted a major flaw. It found
that the state board of education had adopted rules allowing local
school districts to establish minimum standards and to evaluate their
own performance in meeting those standards without a prescribed level
of performance being required.9' Moreover, the court found that state
board rules" allow students to graduate from local schools with mastery of the common core of knowledge and skills at the performance
levels set locally despite the language of the statutory graduation requirement mandating districts to prepare students for college admis-

85. Id. The notion of a "proper" education derives from WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 9, thepertinent
pan of which states: "a thorough and efficient system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of
all
youth of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years.'
86. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1259.
87. Id. at 1259-60 (citing Wyo. STAT. § 21-2-202 (Supp. 1995)).

88. Id. at 1260 (citing WYo. STAT. § 21-2-304 (Supp. 1995)).
89. Id. at 1260 (citing Wyo.
90. Id. at 1260 (citing Wyo.
91. Id. at 1260 (citing WYO.
92. Id. at 1260 (citing Wyo.
93. Id. at 1260 (citing WYO.
Accreditation (1993)).
94. Id. at 1263 (citing WYO.
Accreditation (1993)).

STAT. § 21-3-110 (Supp. 1995)).
STAT. § 21-9-101 (1992)).
STAT. § 21-9-102 (1992)).
STAT. § 21-9-103 (1992)).
STATE. BD. OF EDUC. RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. VI, School
STATE BD. OF EDUC. RULES AND REGULATIONS, ch. VI, School
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sion.11 For the court, this flaw in allowing local school districts considerable autonomy in establishing standards and assessing their own
performance created the potential situation whereby there were "fortynine autonomous education systems" in Wyoming.'
H. The Campbell Decision
The supreme court's decision in Campbell was heavily influenced by
its prior decision in Washakie. The court reiterated its position from the
1980 school finance case that an equal opportunity for a quality education
was a fundamental right guaranteed by the state constitution, and could
not be denied because of unequal funding.' However, in that earlier case
the court had not defined what it meant by "equal opportunity for quality
education," holding instead that until fiscal parity was obtained it was not
possible to achieve "equality of quality."" The court in Washakie simply
required systemic reform of the state educational system, including the
school finance system.
Given its holding in Washakie, the court averred that the primary
issue before it in Campbell was whether the legislature had complied with
its constitutional duty to provide an equal opportunity for a quality education by reforming its system for financing the state's public schools in a
fashion consistent with the dictates of the education articles." After delineating the three constitutional duties of the legislature with respect to
public education," ° the court concluded that these criteria imposed "an affirmative mandatory duty upon the legislature" and "are judicially enforceable in protecting" educational rights."'
Implicitly recognizing a separation of powers issue, the court noted
that the judiciary traditionally will not intrude into legislative policy making. However, with reliance on a 1989 Kentucky school reform case,"

95. Id. at 1263 (citing Wyo. STAT. § 21-3-1 10(a)(xv) (Supp. 1995)).
96. Id. at 1263.

97. Id.
98. Id.

99. Id. at 1263-64.
100. Id. As characterized by the court, the three constitutional duties which evolve from WYO.
CONs'. art. VII, §§ 1 and 9 are:
1.
The "system of public instruction" must be "complete and uniform";
2.
The "system of public schools" must be "thorough and efficient"; and
3.
The thorough and efficient system of public schools must be "adequate to the proper

instruction" of the state's youth.
Id.
101. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1264.
102. Rose v. Council For Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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the court also recognized its duty to rule on unconstitutional enactments
which violate the constitution, and that it must compel legislative action
0 3
when the breach is a failure to act in accordance with the constitution.
Consequently, the Campbell court organized the remainder of its decision
around three themes-the application of an appropriate standard of review
under the equal protection claim, the wealth-based funding disparity
claims, and the distribution formula funding disparity claims.
1. Standard of Review
Depending on whether a funding component was wealth-related
(i.e., revenue raising) or part of the distribution formula (i.e., revenue
distribution), the district court varied in its application of either an
1
equitable allocation/rational basis level of scrutiny or strict scrutiny. °4
Upon review, the court held that the district court erred in applying
equitable allocation/rational scrutiny.'" On the basis of its prior ruling
in Washakie, the court concluded that legislative reforms to the state
school finance system would be reviewed with strict scrutiny to determine whether unjustified fiscal disparities from whatever cause had
been eliminated." ° The court noted that even though its application of
strict scrutiny was applied to funding disparities based on differences
in local wealth in Washakie, it explicitly extended that decision to
include other causes of disparities as well."°7 In Campbell, this extended to and included the disparities caused by the distribution formula.
Under strict scrutiny, any state action that impairs the exercise of a
constitutionally protected right or one that is based upon a suspect
classification will lose its usual presumption of validity; consequently,
the state must justify its action by demonstrating a compelling state
0 8
interest and that no less burdensome alternative is available.'

103. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1264.
104. Id. at 1265.
105. Id. at 1266.
106. Id. (citing Washakie, 606 P.2d at 335).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1266-67. See generally, Julie K. Underwood & William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation:A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. I.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (1991); John Maxfield,
Comment, Wyoming's Equal Protection Clause Mandates Fiscal Neutrality in School Funding, 16
LAND & WATER L. REv. 691 (1981); Stephen A. Bartholow, Comment, Equal Protectionand the Financing of Public Education in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 273 (1973).
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2. Wealth-Based Funding Disparities
a. Recapture
To comply with the fiscal neutrality standard of Washakie, one
school finance reform proposal resulted in a state constitutional amendment to recapture excess property tax revenues from high wealth districts.
The amendment allowed the legislature to collect and distribute to other
school districts up to 75 percent of local revenue in excess of the state
average property tax yield. Subsequently, in 1992 the legislature empowered school districts with statutory authority to keep an additional nine
percent of locally-generated revenue which exceeded the foundation guarantee.' The plaintiffs contested the constitutionality of the 1992 statute
on the grounds that the legislature acted arbitrarily when it failed to provide adequate justification prior to setting the statutory level.' 0
The district court found that although the retention provision was
designed to compensate for the social costs imposed on the wealthy recapture school districts by the mineral extraction industry, non-recapture
districts also incur extra costs due to student population growth that are
not similarly compensated."' Moreover, the district court determined that
the state failed to carry its burden under a strict scrutiny analysis sufficient to justify the wealth-related funding disparities. On the basis of these
findings, the statute
implementing the recapture provision was declared
2
unconstitutional."
The supreme court upheld the district court's ruling on the recapture
provision."' In its rationale, the court opined that only cost-justified
funding differences were permitted, and that the legislature was required
by Washakie to devise a school finance formula based on factors to assign
certain weights for special needs and educational cost differences. Upon
review, the court concluded that the recapture statute did not comport
with these standards and was thus constitutionally deficient in both regards-it was not based upon a weighted formula and the 109-percent
retention level was determined arbitrarily rather than being calculated on
the basis of specific and actual costs. 4

109.

Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1267-68 (citing WYO. STAT. § 21-13-102(b) (1992)).

110. Id. at 1268.
111.

Id.

112. Id.
113.

Id. at 1269.

114. Id.
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b. Optional mill levies
Without state intervention, any local property tax levied against a
school district's assessed property valuation generates an amount of local
revenue different from other school districts because of variations in the
local property tax bases. To demonstrate this fact, the court reported
sample data from two school districts. Campbell County School District
No. One had an assessed valuation of real property of $1.3 billion; and a
one-mill tax levy would raise $1.3 million, or about $162 per each of the
district's 8000 students. Laramie County School District No. One, on the
other hand, had about $269 million in assessed property values and
13,500 students. A one-mill tax rate in Laramie County School District
No. One generates about $269,000, or roughly $19 per student. The
state-wide average was $64.55 per Wyoming student." 5
As noted earlier, every school district is required to assess a 25-mill
levy on local property. The optional mill levy component allowed local
school districts to levy another six-mills of local property taxes to generate funds outside the foundation program without affecting the state aid
entitlement. 16 The six optional mills include three mills for school operations and three mills for maintenance. The first mill within each category
may be levied by the local school board without voter approval. The final
two mills in each category require voter approval."' According to the
finance formula, the state "power equalizes" only the second mill of those
mills requiring voter approval. The power equalization feature is based
upon a formula designed to increase the second one-mill optional local
levy in property-poor school districts to the amount of the state average$64.55 per student.118
The district court found that the optional mill levy created funding
and spending disparities based on local wealth leading to inequitable
educational opportunities." 9 Moreover, the district court found that the
wealthiest districts made the most use of the optional mill levy whereas
other districts either used the resulting revenue to reduce funding disparities, to maintain a basic educational program, or, in the case of some
of the poorer school districts, they did not avail themselves of the optional
mills at all since the levy raised so little money."' ° Even accepting the

115. Id. A mill is .1 of I percent or 1/10 of a cent.
116. Id.

117. WYo. STAT. § 21-12-102 (1992).
118.

Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1269.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1270.
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defendants' assertion that local control was a compelling state interest
sufficient to justify the optional mill levy, the district court found that
there were other alternatives available to permit local discretion without
the resulting revenue disparities. Not surprisingly, the district court concluded that the optional mill levy provision was unconstitutional.' 2
The supreme court upheld this aspect of the district court's conclusion with the rationale that the optional mill levy component created
wealth-based disparities that impacted on educational opportunity throughout the state.' Prior to doing so, however, the court analyzed the
defendants' assertion that local control is recognized constitutionally and
therefore provides a compelling state interest. The court noted that given
its ruling in Washakie that the legislature had complete control over the
school system and its financing, "it would be paradoxical to permit disparity because of local control."" The court also stated it was puzzled at
the assertion of a constitutional basis for local control "since under
Washakie there cannot be both state and local control in establishing a
constitutional education system."' Despite these observations, the court
nonetheless examined Wyoming's constitutional history to settle the issue
of whether local control is a constitutionally recognized interest. On the
basis of an extensive analysis of territorial history and constitutional
language, the court held that "local control is not a constitutionally recognized interest and cannot be the basis for disparity in equal educational
opportunity. " 1
In a related issue, the court also considered whether there was any
constitutional role for optional local enrichment over and above the state
foundation program. Specifically, the court questioned whether the legislature could permit local districts through the optional mill levies to generate funds outside the foundation program "to enrich its students' educational opportunities beyond those offered elsewhere in the state."in The
court reiterated its determination that under the constitution the legislature
must create and maintain a system of schools providing an equal opportunity to a quality education based upon state wealth rather than local
wealth.' 27 The court opined that there might be a very limited circumstance that would permit local districts to supplement their educational
programs with local funds. For the court, this could only be when the
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1274.

127. Id.
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legislature had finally achieved its constitutional duty "of a cost-based,
state-financed proper education,"" - but then only when the legislature
could articulate a compelling reason for providing a funding mechanism
that would allow local enrichment of the education program in an equitable manner. 21 The court also added two cautionary notes: First, 3it
suggested that strict scrutiny might not permit any local enrichment;1 0
and second, that if local enrichment in one school district led to educational innovations that would reasonably benefit all students in the state,
then, by virtue of the constitutional requirement for a proper education,
all students would be entitled to have those innovations made available as
part of the state education program. "
c. Capital constructionfinancing
The district court held that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs of inequities in capital construction funding had failed to prove a
constitutional harm.1 2 Upon review, the supreme court reiterated its
requirement in Washakie that there be equity in the financing of capital
construction (i.e., that funding must come from total state resources
and must be available statewide). 33 This was anchored in the court's
view that school facilities are a vital part of the total educational process." The court's resolve was clear in its direction that "[aill educational purposes must be appropriately and responsibly funded to comply with the constitutional mandates of a complete and uniform system
of public instruction and a thorough and efficient system of public
schools adequate for the proper education of the state's school age
children." 135 Holding that students are deprived of an educational
opportunity because of inadequate school facilities, the court declared
and thus
the capital construction funding element unconstitutional
36
reversed the district court's finding of constitutionality.

128.

Id.

129. Id.
130. Id. (relying on the dissent in Skeen v. Minnesota, 505 N.W.2d 299, 322 (Minn. 1993)).
131. Id. But see, PAUL R. MORT & WALTER C. REUSSER, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 389
(1941) (where the authors discuss the adaptability principle as justification for a state school finance
plan supporting local initiative. According to Mort and Reusser, if local financial initiative leads to

innovations in educational programs, then the state finance system should stimulate rather than hamper local initiative).
132. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1275.
133. Id. at 1275.
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 1274-75.
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3. Distribution Formula Funding Disparities
Yet another major thrust of the plaintiffs' challenge involved certain
components of the school finance distribution formula that allegedly
caused funding disparities. These particular elements included the classroom unit (CRU), the divisors, the municipal divisor, and the recalculation formula. Although recognizing elements of deficiency, irrationality,
and the fact that students in larger school districts were automatically
subject to funding disadvantages, the district court had nonetheless upheld
the distribution system because it found that the plaintiffs had failed to
meet their burden of proof.' The lower court's decision was motivated
by its finding that there was only "a genuine potential" for disparity of
educational quality or educational opportunity. 3 '
The supreme court reversed the district court's ruling with respect to
the distribution formula. The court noted that when applying strict scrutiny to the distribution system, the state would bear the burden of proving
that the funding disparities were cost-justified or that the disparities were
justified by a compelling interest. Critical to the court's analysis was its
reasoning that where the evidence establishes fiscal disparities that are not
justified by educational cost differentials, then disparities of educational
quality or educational opportunity are presumed.' 39 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs do not bear the burden of proof as previously allocated by the
district court. After reviewing the evidence on the various components of
disparities
the distribution system, the court concluded that the identified
4
were not cost-based and were, therefore, unconstitutional. 0
The final portion of the Campbell opinion focused on the meaning of
an equal educational opportunity to a proper education and the imperative
for a cost-based funding system. For the court, the meaning of equal
educational opportunity to a proper education is summarized by the idea
that there should be a level playing field for all children and there must
not be "losers" as a result of the education system and its funding mechanisms. 4' The court opined that a proper education was not a static concept, but that the definition would change over time. The court recognized that there must be a match between the needs of students and the
availability of an appropriate education program regardless of school size
or location. As a basic premise, the court held that for the state school
137. Id. at 1276.
138.

Id.

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1278.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol31/iss2/12

22

Sparkman et al.: Financing Wyoming's Public Schools: The Wyoming Legislature Gets
1996

SCHOOL FINANCE

finance system to provide an equal opportunity for a quality education
resources must be distributed in a manner to level the playing field. 42 If
to fund the
there are to be no losers, then the resources must be adequate
43
educational program needed once that need is determined.
According to the court, "the legislature's paramount priority" is
to support "an opportunity for a complete, proper, quality education"
following the dictates of the education article."4 In fulfilling its constitutional duty, the legislature cannot provide a minimum level of education and then fund it as best it can considering other competing state
functions. The court's command to the legislature was crystal clear:
... competing priorities not of constitutional magnitude are
secondary, and the legislature may not yield to them until constitutionally sufficient provision is made for elementary and secondary education. 4 5
To assist with its judicial mandate, the court provided the following
guidance to the legislature in terms of what must be done to arrive at an
education system that would achieve financial parity:
1. Consideration must be given to "local conditions, special needs
and problems, and educational cost differentials;
2.

A cost of education study must be conducted with the results
being used to inform the creation of a new finance system;

3. The legislature must state and describe what a "proper education" is for a Wyoming child regardless of the child's place of
residence;
4.

The prescribed education system must be the best that can be
done according to legislative specifications;

5. The state-financed quality education must be nearly identical
from district to district;

142. Id. at 1279.
143. Id. The court's language was colorful:
Having no losers in the system requires there be no shrinking pie but a pie of the size
needed. Once education need is determined, the pie must be large enough to fund that
need.
Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1996

23

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 31 [1996], Iss. 2, Art. 12
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

6.

Vol. XXXI

The legislature can provide a mechanism for local enrichment but only
after the state financed quality education program is in
47
place. 1

By giving the legislature until July 1, 1997, to adopt reform legislation and implement a viable school finance system in compliance with the
court's judgment, the legislature has ample time to fulfill its constitutional
duty."4 The court directed the district court to retain jurisdiction of the
case until the legislature has complied with the judgment. Subsequent to
publication of the court's unanimous decision in Campbell, the court entered an order responding to questions as to the 4prospective
operation of
9
the opinion and denying a petition for rehearing.1
Having reviewed the Campbell decision in some detail, the next
section provides a frame of reference as to how Campbell fits within
school finance litigation as viewed from a national perspective.
II.

JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SCHOOL FUNDING CHALLENGES'

0

Federal and state constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. 5' In 1971 California's Supreme Court in Serrano

v. Priest ruled that inequities in the state's system of public school finance
violated the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. 5 2 But in
1973 the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio v. Rodriguez held that mere
relative differences in funding did not violate the equal protection clause
of the U.S. Constitution. 53 After the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in

Rodriguez, plaintiffs suffered a series of defeats." 4 A notable exception to
this trend was the Supreme Court of New Jersey's 1973 decision in Robinson v. Cahill.' The court based its decision for plaintiffs on guarantees
found in the state's education article rather than equal protection claims.
Litigation based on equal protection provisions was revived by the Su-

147. Id. at 1279-80.
148. Id. at 1280.
149. Id. at 1280-81.
150. This section updates part of an earlier work. See John Dayton, An Anatomy of Public
School Funding Litigation. 77 ED. LAW REP. 627 (1992).
151. See Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L.
REv. 1195 (1985).
152. 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
153. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d
635 (Idaho 1975); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d
139 (Or. 1976).
155. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson 1).
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preme Court of California in 1976. In Serrano 11 the court held that
continuing inequities in California's system of school funding violated
equal protection provisions of the state constitution. 56 As more recent
state supreme court decisions attest, equal protection challenges continue
to be a viable litigation strategy for plaintiffs challenging public school
funding inequities." 7 As indicated by the Supreme Court of California's
1976 decision in Serrano II, state courts are free to interpret the provisions of their state's constitution independent of federal precedents, and
may find that provisions in their state's constitution provide greater protection for the state's citizens than similar provisions in the Federal Constitution.'58 Since 1970, more than 250 published opinions have held that
Federal Constitutional minimums were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of various states' constitutions. 19 If state constitutions were interpreted as guaranteeing no greater rights than the Federal Constitution
these guarantees would be largely superfluous since states are prohibited
from falling below federal constitutional minimums. 6°
Most state constitutions contain express guarantees of equality of treatment.'16 The equality provisions contained in the states' bills of rights "are
among the most diverse guarantees found in American constitutions."62
However, despite wide variations in specific constitutional language and
adoption histories, state courts' analyses of equal protection challenges in
school funding cases have been largely uniform because of the pervasive
influence of the federal model of equal protection analysis.' 63 The issues gen156. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (Serrano f/).
157. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
158. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 907 (1977). See also, William J. Brennan Jr.,
State Constittions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
159. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDuc. 219, 227 (1990).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.").
161. See THE AMERICAN BENCH-1985/86, 2491 (1986) ("seven states have no express equality
guarantee in their individual rights provisions: (Del., Minn., Miss., Neb., Okla., R.I. (cf. Art. 1,
§ 2). and Tenn.").
162. See id. at 2492 (provides a table categorizing the provisions of state equal treatment guarantees).
163. For cases following the federal model of equal protection analysis, see Shofstall v. Hollins,
515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn.
1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635
(Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135
(Okla. 1987); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568
(Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). For cases rejecting this approach, see Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d
273 (N.J. 1973). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
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erally considered are: (1) whether education is a fundamental right; (2)
whether the plaintiffs constitute a suspect class; (3) what level of judicial
scrutiny is appropriate in reviewing the state's system of funding; and (4)
whether the state has an appropriate justification for unequal treatment in its
public school funding system.
A. Whether Education is a Fundamental Right
In San Antonio v. Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court applied an explicit-implicit test of fundamentality. Under the Rodriguez test, the answer to
whether education is a fundamental right lies in "assessing whether there is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. "m
Since education provisions are not included in the United States Constitution,
the Court in Rodriguez concluded that education was not a fundamental right
subject to strict scrutiny under the Federal Constitution.
Because provisions concerning state support of education are expressly included in all state constitutions,'o courts employing the Rodriguez explicit-implicit test would conclude that education is a fundamental
right in all states. However, most state courts have rejected the Rodriguez
test of fundamentality.'1 For example, the Supreme Court of California
rejected the Rodriguez test and instead views as fundamental those interests that "because of their impact on those individual rights and liberties
which lie at the core of our free and representative form of government,
are properly considered 'fundamental.' "67
Whether education is deemed a fundamental right by the deciding
court can be significant. Most states' courts require strict scrutiny

164. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,33 (1973).
165. William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State ConstitutionalProvisions in
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1661 (1989). All states except Mississippi mandate legislative support for public education. Id. The Mississippi Constitution makes
education a discretionary function for the legislature. See Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 201.
166. For cases expressly rejecting the Rodriguez explicit-implicit test of fundamentality, see
Serrano I1,
557 P.2d at 952; Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1017; Thonspson , 537 P.2d at 644; Hornbeck, 458
A.2d at 784-85; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973); Board of Educ., 390 N.E.2d at
818; Fair Sch. Fin. Council. 746 P.2d at 1149; Olsen, 554 P.2d at 144 (application of the Rodriguez
test in Oregon would make "liquor by the drink" a fundamental right). Note also that the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Robinson rejected the entire framework of federal equal protection analysis,
making a decision on fundamentality unnecessary. Instead, the: court adopted a balancing test for
analyzing equal protection claims. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282. Under the Robinson test. "the court
weighs the detriment to the education of the children of certain districts against the ostensible justification for the scheme of school financing. If the court determines the detriment is much greater
than the justification, the financing scheme violates the guarantee of equal protection." Olsen, 554
P.2d at 145 (adopting the Robinson test).
167. Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 952.
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when reviewing state actions which impinge on fundamental rights."1
In contrast, a rational basis test is normally applied to interests which
are not deemed fundamental. 169 Generally, the level of scrutiny applied
determines the outcome." 7 Therefore, the determination of whether
education is a fundamental right is an important issue under equal protection analysis, 171at least where the federal model of equal protection
analysis is followed."7
B. Whether the Plaintiffs Constitute a Suspect Class
Under the federal model of equal protection analysis, courts afford
strict scrutiny review to both fundamental rights and suspect classifications. If plaintiffs fail to convince the court that education is a fundamental right, they may still obtain strict 73scrutiny review if they convince the
court they constitute a suspect class.
Suspect classes are traditionally "those based on race, alienage, and
national origin."'

However, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rodriguez,

argued that "personal poverty may entail much the same social stigma as
historically attached to certain racial or ethnic groups."' While at least

168. But see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d
568 (Wis. 1989) (holding that education is a fundamental right, but applying a rational basis test).
The method used by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Shofstall was later criticized by the Supreme
Court of Arizona in Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz.
1994) ("We do not understand how the rational basis test can be used when a fundamental right has
been implicated. They seem to us to be mutually exclusive. If education is a fundamental right, the
compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) ought to apply.").
169. Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 811.
170. See Thro, supra note 159, at 225 n.30 (noting that strict scrutiny is strict in theory, fatal in fact).
171. For cases expressly ruling that education is a fundamental right, see Shofstall, 515 P.2d at
592) (but see Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 811 declining to decide whether education is a fundamental right
under the state's constitution); Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 951; Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255
(Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
790 S.W.2d 186, 192 (Ky. 1989); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Bismarck
Public Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443
S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor, 436
N.W.2d at 579; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333. For cases expressly rejecting education as a fundamental
right, see Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850
P.2d 724, 732 (Idaho 1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 647 (Idaho 1975); Gould v.
Off, 506 N.W.2d 349, 350 (Neb. 1993).
172. A determination of fundamentality is unnecessary under the Robinson balancing rest. For
cases adopting the Robinson test, see Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J. 1973); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ohio 1979); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 145 (Or. 1976).
173. See Julius Menacker, Poverty as a Suspect Class in Public Education Equal Protection
Suits, 54 ED. LAw REP. 1085 (1989).
174. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1297 (5th ed. 1979).
175. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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two courts have accepted this argument,' 76 it is likely that the majority of
courts will continue to reject this argument."
C. Level of JudicialScrutiny
In most cases, when strict scrutiny was applied the state's system
of school funding was overturned. 78 When a rational basis test was
applied the state's system of school funding was generally upheld. 79
The application of intermediate scrutiny to school funding cases has
been rare.'w
D. State Justificationsfor Inequality
When courts follow the federal model of equal protection analysis, the state must "demonstrate some compelling State interest to
justify the unequal classification" to withstand strict scrutiny. 8 ' The
state will generally fail to meet this heavy burden of proof.u In the
cases in which intermediate scrutiny has been applied no adequate justification has been identified.t" Remaining for consideration is what
176. See Serrano 11,
557 P.2d at 951; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 334.
177. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021 (Colo. 1982); Thompson
v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 645-46 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 787. Recognizing poverty
as a suspect classification may implicate other areas of social welfare legislation, with the possibility
of opening the floodgates of litigation in these politically volatile areas.
178. See Serrano 11, 557 P.2d at 951; Serrano 1, 487 P.2d at 1259; Horton v. Meskill, 376
A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979). But see
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn. 1993) (ruling for the state and holding that
education is a fundamental right but applying strict scrutiny only up to the baseline of minimal
adequacy in education, while applying a rational basis test to funding beyond the level of minimal adequacy); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (ruling for the state
and holding that education is a fundamental right and that the state's system of funding withstands a strict scrutiny test).
179. See Shofstall, 515 P.2d at 592; Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005,
1011 (Colo. 1982); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck, 458
A.2d at 788; Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
366 (N.Y. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821 (Ohio 1979); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (Okla. 1987); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa.
1979); Richland Co. v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 1988); Kukor v. Grover, 436
N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989). But see Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93
(Ark. 1983); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys.v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 155 (Tenn. 1993)
(holding that public school funding systems failed even a rational basis test).
180. See Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 788 (noting that Maryland's system of public school funding
would withstand intermediate scrutiny, but rejecting intermediate scrutiny in favor of a rational basis
test); Bismarck v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994) (holding that education is a fundamental
right and applying intermediate scrutiny).
181. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 878.
182. See Serrano 1,487 P.2d at 1260; Horton, 376 A.2d at 374. But see Scott, 443 S.E.2d at
142 (finding that the state's system of funding withstood strict scrutiny review).
183. See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 259 (N.D. 1994);
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state justification is accepted when the court applies a rational basis
test.
According to La Morte: "The most pervasive rationale employed in
upholding the status quo involved the preservation of local control over
education.""' 4 When courts have applied a rational basis test to school funding systems challenged under equal protection guarantees, at least two courts
have rejected the rationale of local control." Other courts have accepted the
rationale of local control as sufficient justification for the funding systems.'I
Courts overturning the state's system of school funding have criticized the argument that local control justifies educational funding inequities. The Supreme Court of California in Serrano II described this rationale as a "cruel illusion" which far from being necessary to promote local
control "actually deprives the less wealthy districts of the option.""
Several other states' supreme courts have reached a similar conclusion. a

Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 788 (noting that Maryland's system of public school funding would withstand
intermediate scrutiny, but rejected intermediate scrutiny in favor of a rational basis test).
184. See Michael W. La Morte, Courts Continue to Address the Wealth Disparity Issue, 11
EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 3, 11 (1989).
185. Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983) (rejecting the rationale
of local control as justification for funding disparities, and holding that the Arkansas system of school
funding failed even a rational basis test); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,
155 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that public school funding systems failed even a rational basis test). See
also Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 260-61 (applying intermediate scrutiny and rejecting the state's rationale of local control, holding that local control in North Dakota "is undercut and limited by the
legislature's enactment of requirements for statewide uniformity of education").
186. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022-23 (Colo. 1982);
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (Ga. 1981); Hornbeck , 458 A.2d at 789; Board of
Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982); Board
of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 821 (Ohio 1979); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 146 (Or.
1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568,
580-81 (Wis. 1989).
187. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 948 (Cal. 1976) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d
12141, 1261 (Cal. 1971)).
188. See Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93 ("mo alter the state financing system toprovide greater
equalization among districts does not in any way dictate that local control must be reduced"); Helena
Elementary Seh. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989) (ruling that spending disparities actually deny local control to poorer schools); Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 260-261 (rejecting
local control as a justification for disparities and finding that "local control in North Dakota is undercut and limited by the Legislature's enactment of requirements of statewide uniformity of education");
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 154 ("[T]he better reasoned opinions are those which have
rejected the argument that local control is justification for disparity in opportunity."); Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989) (improved equity "will actually allow
for more local control, not less. It will provide property-poor districts with economic alternatives that
are not now available to them. Only if alternatives are indeed available can a community exercise the
control of making choices").
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III. EDUCATION ARTICLE CHALLENGES
Shortly after the plaintiffs' defeat in San Antonio v. Rodriguez,"s
plaintiffs' hopes for success in school funding cases were revived in
Robinson v. Cahill.190 In Robinson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
ruled that the state's system of public school funding was unconstitutional
because it failed to meet the requirements of the New Jersey
Constitution's education article. All states have constitutional provisions
describing each state's role in supporting public education.' 91 State education articles continue to provide a successful basis for constitutional
challenges to school funding inequities."
On the basis of a thorough review of educational article litigation, it
appears that state judicial resolution of education article challenges generally involves a three-step process: (1) the court must interpret the meaning
of the education article; (2) on the basis of this interpretation the court
must determine the magnitude of the state's constitutional duty to support
education; and (3) the court must determine whether the state has met the
assigned constitutional obligation.
A. Interpreting the Education Article
Some legal scholars have suggested that education articles can be
divided into a four-part framework based on the apparent strength of the
constitutional language. 0 3 Under this framework, category I clauses impose only a minimal educational obligation on the state," 9 category II
clauses impose a slightly higher duty requiring a certain minimum standard of quality, 9 ' category III clauses contain stronger and more specific

189. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
190. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
191. For a listing of the specific language found in the education clauses of all states, see Allen
W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under State ConstitutionalLaw,
18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 134 (1989).
192. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (ruling
for plaintiffs based on the state constitution's education article).
193. Thro, supra, note 165, at 1661.
194. State constitutions with category I clauses are: ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256,
ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § I; CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAW.
CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Miss. CONST. art.
VIII, § 201; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONsr. art. XI, § 1;
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI; UTAH CONST.
art. X. § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2. § 68.
195. State constitutions with category II clauses are: ARK. CONST. art. XIV. § 1; COLO.
CoNsr. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONsT. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX,
§ 1; KY. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; MONT. CONST.
art. X. § 1; N.J. CONSr. art. VIII, § 4; N.D. CONST. art VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OR.
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mandates,1'9 and category IV clauses impose the highest level of state
obligation. 'I In theory, the likelihood that a state's system of funding will
be overturned is the lowest in category I and the highest in category IV.
However, a review of judicial98 decisions on school funding challenges
indicates no consistent pattern.1
Although there are wide variations in judicial interpretations of
constitutional language, there appears to be some consistency regarding
the methodology of interpretation. In school funding cases, courts have
used three methods of constitutional interpretation: (1) historical analysis
of constitutional debates and early legislative interpretations; 9 (2) the

CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONS?. art. III, § 14; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. VII,
§ 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST, art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
196. State constitutions with category III clauses are: CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST.
art. VIII. § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; MASS. CONS?. pt. 2. ch. 5, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. XI,
§ 2; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
197. State constitutions with category IV clauses are: GA. CONS?. art. VIII, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MIlCt. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MO. CONST. art. IX,
§ 1(a); N.H. CONS?. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
198. Category I - Alabama, Alaska, *Arizona, *Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, +New York, North Carolina, +Oklahoma, +South Carolina,
Utah, Vermont.
Category II-*Arkansas, +Colorado, Delaware, Florida, +Idaho, *Kentucky, +Maryland, +Minnesota, *Montana, *New Jersey, *North Dakota, +Ohio, +Oregon, +Pennsylvania,
*Tennessee, *Texas, +Virginia, *West Virginia, +Wisconsin.
Category Il-*Califomia, Indiana, Iowa, *Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, *Wyoming.
Category IV-+Georgia, Illinois, Maine, +Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, *Washington.
+ (upheld)
* (declared unconstitutional)
There is no strong correlation between the strength of constitutional language and the outcome of school funding cases. However, in defense of this framework, it should be noted that factors
unrelated to constitutional language (differences in factual findings, constitutional histories, decisions
based on equal protection rather than education article language, etc.) may have skewed the results in
reported cases.
Although conceptually useful, Thro's state-by-state categorization is dated. See e.g., William
E. Sparkman & Fred Hartmeister, The Edgewood Saga Continues: The Texas School FinanceSystem
is Constitutional-ButNot Yet Out of the Woods, 101 EDUC. LAW REP. 509 (1995). Following the
Texas Supreme Court's most recent ruling in what is now the fourth in a series of Edgewood decisions, Texas would now be listed on Thro's categories as a "-+ " rather than as a "*.
199. For cases using the historical mode of analysis, see Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994): Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d
1005, 1011 (Colo, 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 163 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v.
Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 641 (Idaho 1975); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205
(Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Edue., 615 N.E.2d 516, 523 (Mass.
1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993); Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273, 287 (N.J. 1973); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. No. One v.
Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368 (N.Y. 1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (Ohio
1979); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d
470, 472 (S.C. 1988); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 866 (W. Va. 1979).
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plain meaning of constitutional language;' and (3) a review of other
judicial interpretations of similar language."' The majority approach is
historical analysis.m However, many courts use a combination of these
modes of analysis 203
B. Determining the Magnitude of the Duty
Once the court has determined the meaning of constitutional language, the court attempts to extract a measurable duty for the legislature
in supporting education. Judicially interpreted state duties have ranged
from a declaration that children had a "constitutionally paramount...
right to be amply provided with an education," 0 to near total deference,
finding that "the framers of the constitution have left the legislature free
to choose the means of funding the schools . . . ."
Courts that found high levels of legislative duty to support education generally determined that the constitution allowed less legislative
discretion in school funding. These courts were more likely to find
that the constitution prohibited significant funding disparities.' In
contrast, courts that found relatively low levels of legislative duty to
support education generally determined that the constitution allowed
broad legislative discretion in school funding; did not require substan200. For cases using the plain meaning mode of analysis, see Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd.
of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d
684, 689 (Mont. 1989); Fair School Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989); Scott v. Commonwealth,
443 S.E.2d 138, 141 (Va. 1994); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 574 (Wis. 1989).
201. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92-93 (Ark. 1983). Note also that
other courts use this method in addition to other modes of analysis, see Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 777
(Md. 1983); Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 866; Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 210.
202. See supra note 199. Some courts have included an extensive historical analysis in their
opinions. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 523; Claremont Sch. Dist., 635 A.2d at 1377.
203. For courts using multiple modes of analysis, see Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205, 210; Hornbeck,
458 A.2d at 776; Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 308 (Minn. 1993); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-151 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394; Pauley, 255
S.E.2d at 866; Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 574; Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238,
1257 (Wyo. 1995).
204. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (Wash. 1978).
205. Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 1988).
206. See Robinson, 303 A.2d 273, at 297 (finding that a disparity in expenditures violated the
constitutional mandate, and that education funding was a state legislative responsibility, not a local
responsibility); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One, 585 P.2d at92 (holding that the legislature has a paramount duty to support education, and that children have a right to be amply provided with an education); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205 (holding that the legislature has the sole obligation to provide for
education throughout the state by appropriate legislation, and that the system must be an efficient
one); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396-97 (holding that large disparities in funding are prohibited by the
constitution, and that the legislature must devise a system which correlates tax efforts and educational
resources) .
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tial equality in expenditures; and required only a basic or a minimally
adequate education.'
C.

Determining Whether the State Has Met the Assigned Constitutional
Obligation

A determination of whether the state has met its constitutional duty
to support education involves measuring the factual findings regarding the
state's funding system against the judicially determined constitutional standard. Those systems falling below the constitutional standard are overturned,' and those meeting or exceeding the constitutional mandate are
upheld.' If the court determines the constitution establishes a high degree
of legislative duty to support education, the state's system is generally
declared unconstitutional."' If the court finds a low degree of legislative
duty, the state's system is generally upheld. "
IV.

REFLECTIONS ON CAMPBELL

Although binding only in Wyoming, the Campbell decision should
reverberate nationally given the Wyoming Supreme Court's position on
several key themes and issues. As previously demonstrated in the "Educa-

207. See Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824-25 (Ohio 1979) (granting the legislature wide discretion in school funding, limited only where a student is effectively deprived of educational opportunity); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (Ga. 1981) (the constitution requires
only an adequate education and basic educational opportunity); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 (N.Y. 1982) (requiring only a sound basic education);
Honbeck, 458 A.2d at 780 (rejecting mathematical equality in school funding); Fair Sch. Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987) (the constitution requires only a basic, adequate education); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (S.C. 1988) (the legislature is free to
choose the method of school funding).
208. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (Wash. 1978); Washakie County
Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
One v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 398.
209. See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 1973); Thompson v. Engelking, 537
P.2d 635, 641 (Idaho 1975); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165; Hombeck, 458 A.2d at 780.
210. See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295 (holding discrepancies in dollar input per child inconsistent
with the demands of the constitution); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. One, 585 P.2d at 92 (establishing a paramount constitutional duty for the state to amply provide for education); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at
396 (The constitution prohibits the vast disparities as now exist.).
211. See Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824-25 (Ohio 1979) (interpreting the
constitution as providing wide discretion in funding for the state, limited only where a child is effectively deprived of educational opportunity); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 165 (requiring merely a basic
adequate education); Levittown, 439 N.E.2d at 369 (the constitution only requires a basic sound education); Fair Sch. Fin. Council, 746 P.2d at 1149 (only a basic, adequate education is required);
Richland County, 364 S.E.2d at 472 (the constitution leaves the legislature free to determine the
method of school finance).
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tion Article Challenges" section of this article, constitutional language
describing the duty of the legislature vis d vis public education is clearly a
vital issue in contemporary school finance litigation across the nation. In
this regard, a most important relationship exists between the constitutional
mandate incorporated within a state's education article and how strongly
the legislature feels its duty is to comply with the mandate following
judicial intervention.212 Although Thro" 3 places Wyoming's education
article within a category of constitutional provisions which contain stronger and more specific mandates than the weaker language perceived in
other categories, the Campbell decision suggests that the court imposed
the highest level of state obligation for public education.2"4
It remains to be seen if courts in other states will follow Wyoming's
lead and invoke a similarly strong approach to the legislature's obligation
under their respective education articles. Perhaps one possibility is that
Campbell will simply be construed as an outlier with little influence in
other states. If, in fact, Campbell does portend a shift toward stronger
constitutional interpretations, it raises the question of whether legislators
or citizens will-or should-seek a constitutional amendment to weaken
the language of the education article. 2 ' A second possibility might involve
school finance reformers similarly seeking a constitutional amendment to
strengthen the education article in a particular state.
It is noteworthy that the Campbell court held that there must be
equity in the financing of capital outlay needs of Wyoming's school districts.2 6 Since capital outlay financing has traditionally been the responsibility of local school districts, local wealth definitely plays a factor in
access to resources. Some states provide various forms of assistance to
local school districts with their building needs.2

212. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 196.
214. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
215. Despite not being directly on point with the school funding issues but apparently as a result
of the perceived impact of the court's handling of local control concerns in Campbell, Senator Charles
Scott, R-30/Casper, sponsored a proposed constitutional amendment during the 1996 legislative session. The proposed amendment focused on local school district autonomy and ostensibly restoring responsibility for making curricular decisions at the local level. Although the proposed amendment
failed to clear the Senate in a close (14-13) vote, it would appear that the question of constitutional
changes being revisited is far from over. Brett Martel, Local Control Fails by Bare Minimum, CHEYENNE (WYo.) TRIBUNE-EAGLE, Feb. 22, 1996, at A6.

216. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1274-75.
217. See generally, DAVID C. THOMPSON Er AL., FISCAL LEADERSHIP FOR SCHOOLS:
CONCEPTrS AND PRACTICES 560-61 (1994). See also, FArH E. CRAMvTON & TERRY N. WHITNEY, Equity and State Funding of School Facilities, 3 NCSL LEGISBRIEF No. 15 (April 1995)

(where the authors provide a summary of school finance litigation in the United States involving
capital outlay funding).
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Questions concerning the alleged relationship between expenditures
and educational opportunity, educational harm associated with spending
inequities, and the effects of unequal capital funding often arise in school
funding litigation. Regarding the alleged relationship between expenditures and educational opportunity, no plaintiff since Serrano v. Priest 8
has ultimately prevailed without convincing the court of the existence of a
positive correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity."'
The obvious explanation is that if expenditures do not affect the quality of
educational opportunity, the funding equalization order sought by
plaintiffs would not rationally promote the constitutional interest in educational opportunity the court sees itself as being charged with protecting.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court had previously addressed the correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity in Washakie,2" and
in Campbell the court affirmed its earlier holding on the issue.m The
court recognized a positive relationship between expenditures and educational opportunity, joining many other states' highest courts ruling on this
issue.' Referring to its earlier decision in Washakie, the court stated:
"Washakie presumes funding disparity results in educational opportunity
disparity."' Although recognizing a correlation between expenditures
and educational opportunity, the court also recognized that exact equality
of expenditures is not constitutionally required, explaining: "More money

218. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
219. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 809 (Ariz. 1994); Dupree
v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal.
1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 368 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d
186, 198 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 552-53
(Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 687 (Mont. 1989); Bismarck
Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 261 (N.D. 1994) (affinming a district court judgment that "the
overall impact of the entire statutory method for distributing funding for education in North Dakota is unconstitutional" but lacking the super-majority required by the North Dakota Constitution to declare statutes
unconstitutional); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 277
(N.J. 1973); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.w.2d 139, 144 (Tenn. 1993); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 97 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Bailey, 324 S.E.2d 128, 131 (W. Va.
1984); Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 332 (Wyo. 1980). But see McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 160 (Ga. 1981); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist,
439 N.E.2d 359, 363 n.3 (N.Y. 1982) (recognizing this correlation but nonetheless ruling in favor of the
state).
220. For a more thorough examination of this issue, see John Dayton, Correlating Expenditures
and Educational Opportunity in School Funding Litigation: The Judicial Perspective, 19 J. EDUC.
FIN. 167 (1994).
221. Washakie, 606 P.2d at 332 ("the quality of a child's education in Wyoming, measured in
terms of dollars available for that purpose, is dependent upon the property tax resources of his school
district").
222. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1276-77.
223. See supra note 220.
224. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1277.
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may be needed in one school district to achieve quality education than in
another" because of legitimate differences in costs.' To date, no state's
highest court has required exact equality in per pupil expenditures.'
One of the difficulties for plaintiffs in establishing the necessary
correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity is the nebulous nature of educational opportunity. Because of the difficulty of advancing arguments related to academic abstractions of educational opportunity, plaintiffs in recent cases have focused on more tangible examples
of harm to students. Evidence showing a demonstrable harmful effect on
children resulting from lower expenditures provides a more tangible
example of the inequities produced by the state's system of funding than
more academic and abstract expenditure-opportunity arguments. For
example, In Roosevelt v. Bishop the Arizona Supreme Court recognized
tangible harm resulting to children because of inadequate funding for
facilities. The court found:
There are disparities in the number of schools, their condition,
their age, and the quality of classrooms and equipment. Some
districts have schoolhouses that are unsafe, unhealthy, and in
violation of building, fire, and safety codes. Some districts use
dirt lots for playgrounds. There are schools without libraries, science laboratories, computer rooms, art programs, gymnasiums,
and auditoriums. But in other districts, there are schools with
indoor swimming pools, a domed stadium, science laboratories,
television studios, well stocked libraries, satellite dishes, and
extensive computer systems.'
Courts in other recent school funding opinions have also recognized
harm resulting from inadequate funding.m In Campbell, the Wyoming
Supreme Court recognized educational harm related to funding disparities 9 and found that: "Educational research reports a relationship between the condition of buildings and quality of education. "' The court
concluded: "We hold deficient physical facilities deprive students of an

225. Id. at 1246.
226. See Dupree. 651 S.W.2d at 93; Serrano, 557 P.2d 929 at 939; Horton, 376 A.2d at
376; Hornbeck v. Somerset, 458 A.2d 758, 780 (Md. 1983); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 522;
Helena, 769 P.2d at 691; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 297-98; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 865 n.7;
Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336.
227. 877 P.2d at 808.
228. See e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197; Helena, 769 P.2d at 687; Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at

261; Abbott, 575 A.2d at 395; McWherter. 851 S.W.2d at 144.
229. 907 P.2d at 1250-51.
230. Id. at 1255.
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equal education opportunity and any financing system that allows such
deficient facilities to exist is unconstitutional.",,'
Another theme that bears mentioning was the Campbell court's willingness to embrace the notion that the state funding formula must compensate for special needs. 2 State school finance systems over the past 20
years have been designed to accommodate varying needs of students and
school districts by including a variety of weighing factors in the form of
program cost differentials, cost of living adjustments, teacher training and
experience indices, cost of education factors, sparsity factors and small
school adjustments, just to name a few. 3
There are two correlative issues that bear mentioning in this context.
One is historical in nature, and relates to the evolution in school finance
policy and the court's understanding of this process. In the late 1960s,
legal challenges were filed in federal district courts in Illinois' and Virginia' against the states' school finance systems. Both cases involved
claims from property-poor school districts that the funding formulas failed
to consider the variety of educational needs existing within such school
districts. In the Illinois case, the federal district court described educational needs as a "nebulous concept," and dismissed the case noting that there
"are no 'discoverable and manageable standards'" to determine the constitutionality of the school finance system." Similarly, the federal district
court in Virginia held that "the courts have neither the knowledge, nor
the means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying
needs of these students throughout the state." 7 By comparison, the Wyoming Supreme Court clearly was not deterred when confronted with the
issue of special education needs in Campbell.
A second related issue which might generate concern for state
legislatures throughout the United States was the court's ruling in
Campbell that any cost differentials must not be based on political
assumptions; rather, such differentials must be justified by actual cost

231. Id. at 1275.
232. Id. at 1246 (citing Washakie, 606 P.2d at 336).
233.

See generally, ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0.

PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY

PERSPECTIVE 208-41 (1992) (where the authors discuss formula adjustments for student needs, education level, scale economies, and price). Adjustment factors in school finance formulas can be traced to
the seminal work of PAUL R. MORT, THE MEASUREMENT OF EDUCATIONAL NEED (1924) (where the
author developed a technique for deriving a measure of the educational need as a basis for the distribution of state aid to local school districts).
234. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.11. 1968), afd 89 S.Ct. 1197 (1969).
235. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
236. Mclnnis, 293 F. Supp. at 329 n.4, 335.
237. Burruss, 310 F. Supp. at 574.
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studies absent which they will risk being considered arbitrary and
irrational." 8 As noted, since many state school finance programs make
cost adjustments in the distribution of state aid ostensibly to compensate for legitimate cost differences, it is likely that legislatures may put
to the test to show that the adjustments are based on actual cost analysis. Although it is not uncommon for state departments of education
or legislative study committees to periodically undertake a variety of
finance studies, the real challenge is for the legislature to actually use
the results as a basis for public policy. If policy decisions must be
made as a result of empirical cost analyses, real funding costs will
likely increase and legislators will lose their ability to structure political compromises that often are part of lawmaking.
In what is probably the most far-reaching part of the Campbell
decision, the court required a complete redesign of the state's public
school system "to fulfill the constitutional command that 'equality of
financing will achieve equality of quality.' " 9 Others states, most notably
West Virginia' and Kentucky, 24 have had to deal with similar rulings by
their highest courts. This suggests that a state's entire educational system
is not immune from litigation, especially when the courts apply an expansive interpretation of the state's education article. It will be interesting to
see whether the educational system redesign that has been ordered in
other states is having its intended results. Additional compliance litigation
certainly is not out of the question.
The Wyoming Legislature was told by the supreme court that financing education was its paramount duty and that financing education could
not be done on a left-over basis.' 2 Again, this raises significant questions
of public policy involving the real competition among various state functions (e.g. prisons, highways, post-secondary education to name just a
few), and the growing costs of these important services. It certainly could
be argued that increased funding for public education would ultimately
lower prison costs,23 but this argument often falls on deaf ears as voters
demand more prisons and longer sentences for convicted criminals.

238. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1268-69.
239. Id. at 1279.
240. Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268, Opinion, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order, at 221 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha County, W.Va., filed May 11, 1982) (on remandfollowing Pauley
v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979)).
241. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
242. Campbell. 907 P.2d at 1279.
243. See Charles S.Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Financein Texas, New Jersey. and
Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 403 (1991) ("School failure is associated with incarceration,
welfare dependency, and bad health, all of which drain the public coffers.").
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In conclusion, the vast majority of school finance-related issues
raised in Campbell are not unique to Wyoming. As this article demonstrates, many other states have confronted these issues-often with mixed
results in terms of the ultimate outcomes in each case. Moreover, it is
clear that these issues will not go away, and that courts in other states
will continue to grapple with the complex issues surrounding school
finance policy. Ultimately, however, these issues will play out in a much
broader policy arena. 2 "

244. The court ordered that the Wyoming legislature achieve compliance with the Campbell
decision by no later than July 1, 1997. Campbell, 907 P.2d at 1280. Although public education and
school finance received substantial attention throughout the course of the 1996 legislative budget
session, essentially the state's legislative response to date has consisted of the creation of a select
committee charged with drafting a revamped school finance system for consideration and adoption
prior to the court's deadline. Jennifer Hafner, Process to Build New Education Fund System May Cost
$550,000," RIVERTON RANGER, Jan. 30, 1996, at 1.
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